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T

HE QUESTION OF HOW TO RESPOND to violations of the laws of

armed conflict has been a key issue in international relations and in the
politics of many countries in the 1980s and 1990s. In a development that
involves risks as well as advantages, States have increasingly looked to
international institutions, especially the United Nations, to address questions
of enforcement. The main arguments of this paper are that:
• The formal mechanisms of implementation provided for in the treaties
have for the most part not been effective;
• The United Nations has assumed a more important role in
implementation than in any previous period and has been allocated further
such roles in various treaties;
• Despite the growth of the UN's role, States and alliances remain
essential, if flawed, agencies of implementation and enforcement; and
• Enforcement of this body of law can take many and varied forms:
international trials are only one of them, and not necessarily the most
effective.

The opinions shared in this paper are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views
and opinions of the U.S. Naval War College, the Dept. of the Navy, or Dept. of Defense.

Implementation of the Laws of War
The body of law under discussion here has increasingly come to be termed
"international humanitarian law." This is a fashionable but flawed
contemporary reincarnation of the older term "laws of war," which continues
to have merits, and which I have preferred in this paper. To imply that the
ethical basis and underlying character of the law is exclusively humanitarian
and international may be attractive to some, but it may also dent the credibility
of the law among those in governments and armed forces who have to
implement it.
Because the focus here is on responses to violations, a critically important
aspect of implementation is not discussed, namely, the regular internal
processes by which States-in peacetime as much as in war-bring their own
law, policy, and practice into line with the laws of war, educate the public on
their content, and train their armed forces accordingly. Rather, the focus here
is what happens when there are violations.
Five considerations help to explain why, arising from the conflicts of the
1980s and 1990s, the subject ofimplementation and enforcement of the laws of
war has been so central and difficult an issue in international diplomacy.
First, the scale and frequency of serious infractions of existing rules have
been greater than in earlier decades. There have been violations of basic rules
including:
by many belligerents, State and
• Iraq's use of chemical weapons during the
War
and its wanton destruction of property and mistreatment of prisoners following
its seizure of Kuwait
• Somali factions' persistent interference with relief efforts and attacks on
civilians, especially in
1994;
• Systematic attacks on civilian populations and cruelty to detainees in the
conflicts in former Yugoslavia that started in June 1991;
• Genocidal practices in Rwanda in 1994; and
• The widespread use of antipersonnel land mines in ways which conflict
with fundamental principles of the laws of war and cause huge casualties
(mainly of civilians) during and especially after wars.
Second, some (but not all) of the atrocities of the 1980s and 1990s have
been in conflicts with at least some element of civil war. Such wars are often
more bitter than international wars: they frequently involve deliberate
mentality. Getting parties in such
targeting of civilians and a
wars to act in any kind of disciplined manner has always been difficult.
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The rules formally and indisputably applicable to civil wars are relatively
few. They include the 1948 Genocide Convention; the 1949 Geneva
Conventions, common Article 3; and the 1977 Additional Protocol II. Two
major agreements on land mines, neither of them yet in force at the time of
writing, also encompass civil war situations as well as international war. These
are the 1996 Amended Protocol II of the 1981 Convention on Specific
1
Conventional \Veapons, which places restrictions on the use ofland
and the 1997 Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling,
Production and Transfer of
Personnel Mines and on Their Destruction.2
These rules applicable to internal conflicts, although they seek to prohibit
many of the atrocities of the type that have occurred, are more limited than
those for international armed conflicts. Various attempts have been made to
get over this problem. In the cases of former Yugoslavia and Rwanda, the UN
Security Council has proclaimed or implied the applicability of a wide range of
rules of humanitarian law, thus seeking to reduce somewhat the significance of
the question of whether a particular conflict, or aspects thereof, is to be deemed
internal or international. However, the main difficulty in many civil wars is not
so much one of extending the range of applicable rules but rather (as discussed
next) of getting parties to observe even the most minimal restraints.
Third, in many of the atrocities of recent years (and other cases could be
added to the litany of frightfulness) it has not been a serious problem to establish
what the law is, or even what the facts of the particular case are. Nor has the
critical issue generally been whether in individual cases a State (or
party concerned has acceded to particular treaties or has indicated adherence in
some other way, or is bound anyway, with or without its explicit consent, by basic
customary rules. The most critical issue-which affects many key international
decisions yet to be made, including over Bosnia-has been what to do when,
despite the existence of rules and the clearest possible warnings that they must be
implemented, States and
bodies persistently violate them and then
refuse to investigate and punish those responsible.
War the UN Security Council has
Fourth, from the time of the
acquired a major role in the implementation of the laws of war. Although the
United Nations as a wartime alliance had been involved in war crimes issues,
this expanded role was not foreseen in the UN Charter, and it has involved
moving into uncharted territory. In the 1990s the Security Council has been
particularly preoccupied with war crimes in conflicts involving Iraq,
Yugoslavia, Somalia, and Rwanda. In addition, several arms control and
treaties have progressively increased the UN's roles in
enforcement matters.
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Fifth, the UN, and the Western powers in particular, have faced harsh
choices about the extent to which they should pursue the war crimes issue in
phase of two major conflicts, namely the Gulf in 1991, and
the
Bosnia and Herzegovina in 1995. They faced similar issues in Somalia in
1994, when the question was posed in the form of what to do about
General Mohammed Farah Aideed, and in many other conflicts. The role that
legal prosecution for war crimes, and the pursuit of compensation for victims,
can and should have in the larger process of peacemaking has proved to be as
tangled an issue in the 1990s as in previous eras.
§

§

§

There is nothing new in recognizing that the problem of implementation of
the laws of war is both important and difficult.3 However, with rare exceptions
it has not been the subject of a vigorous tradition of thought. Many lawyers,
and others, like to think of enforcement exclusively in terms of criminal trial
after a violation. However, implementation may take many other legal,
administrative, or military forms.
Analysis of the question of implementation can benefit from a more
descriptive approach, looking systematically at the many difficulties, and
opportunities, "that have been encountered in applying the laws of war. Such an
approach employs the methodologies not only of law but also of history,
politics, international relations, and strategic studies.4 The major
work along such lines, Geoffrey Best's examination of whether or not the body
oflaw governing armed conflicts has worked well since the Second World War,
reaches pessimistic conclusions. He draws a picture of a body of law with an
impressive and admirable superstructure built on insecure foundations, of
which perhaps the shakiest is the central, critical distinction between the
soldier and the civilian. The law's impact has been much less than had been
hoped. Sometimes, indeed, it has been little more than an instrument of
propaganda warfare.s My own conclusions, only slightly less pessimistic than
those of Professor Best, are more narrowly concentrated on the question of
implementation in the wake of violations, and they reflect developments up to
the end ofJanuary 1998.6
The Various Forms and Mechanisms of Implementation
What induces parties to armed conflicts to observe certain rules of restraint?
The 1992 German triservice military manual lists no less than thirteen factors,
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mainly treaty based, that "can induce the parties to a conflict to counteract
disobedience of the law applicable in armed conflicts and thus to enforce
observance of international humanitarian law": consideration for public
opinion, reciprocal interests of the parties to the conflict, maintenance of
discipline, fear of reprisals, penal and disciplinary measures, fear of payment of
compensation, activities of protecting powers, international fact,finding, the
activities of the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), diplomatic
activities, national implementing measures, dissemination of humanitarian
law, and the personal conviction and responsibility of the individual. 7
While this list is admirably broad, it is not complete. It does not describe the
wide range of "national implementing measures" that may be attempted,
especially national commissions of inquiry (discussed further below).
Moreover, it does not include as distinct factors either the implementation
roles of the United Nations, or the possibility that violations could lead to
multilateral military action being initiated against the violators. Events in
Somalia in late 1992, and in Bosnia and Herzegovina in 1995, confirm that
multilateral military action may be triggered by violations, and may be among
the many ways in which the UN and other multilateral bodies can get involved
in enforcement.

Some Provisions of International Legal Agreements. The 1899 and 1907
Hague Conventions on Land War, and the Regulations annexed to them, are
imprecise on the matter of ensuring compliance. Article 1 of the 1899 and 1907
Hague Conventions requires the powers to issue instructions to their land
forces in conformity with the Regulations. Article 3 of the 1907 Convention
says that a belligerent party violating the Regulations "shall, if the case
demands, be liable to pay compensation." In addition, Article 56 of the 1899
and 1907 Hague Regulations makes a vague reference to legal proceedings in
the event of violation of its rules about certain types of public property.8
Nothing more is said about how these or other provisions are to be enforced.
The many striking omissions regarding enforcement exposed the Hague system
to the accusation that it was based on unduly optimistic assumptions.
However, the relative paucity of formal provisions in the Hague
Conventions and Regulations did not mean that there was no implementation
system at all. The central assumption, of which the above,summarized
provisions are a mere reflection, was of a responsibility on States to ensure that
the rules were observed and offenders brought to justice. This assumption has
many weaknesses, of which the most obvious-easy to identify but hard to
remedy-is that most governments have been, quite understandably, reluctant
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to prosecute their own servants in cases where their violations of the laws of
war were carried out while pursuing government policy. It is this problem above
all which has sustained an unbroken series of calls for some diminution of
national sovereignty so far as the punishment of war crimes and crimes against
humanity is concerned.
In the
period there have been many efforts to devise formal
international legal provisions regarding implementation. Many of those that
have been adopted in treaty form have in practice been ignored or sidestepped.
For example, the system outlined in the 1949 Geneva Conventions of using the
institution of Protecting Powers to supervise and implement the Conventions'
provisions has not been widely used; and States have observed unevenly their
duty to ensure that all those suspected of grave breaches are tried.
There have also been problems with the body established under the 1977
Geneva Protocol I with the specific purpose of investigating violations. Article
90 of that treaty provides for the establishment on a permanent basis, with
periodic elections, of an International
Commission to:
(i) Enquire into any facts alleged to be a grave breach as defined in the
Conventions and this Protocol or other serious violation of the Conventions or
of this Protocol;
(ii) Facilitate, through its good offices. the restoration of an attitude of
respect for the Conventions and this Protocol.

The International Humanitarian
Commission was duly set up in
June 1991, and became operational in July 1992. Yet not a single one of the
numerous problems between then and now has been referred to it. In the
delicate words of its president, the Commission has been trying "to draw the
international community's attention to its availability.,,9 It has tried in vain for
well over five years.
The relevance of the
Finding Commission is called into question by the
development, explored further below, that in the years since the Commission
was established the UN Security Council has developed ad hoc mechanisms for
investigating and taking action regarding violations, most notably in
connection with the wars in the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda. For a variety
of perfectly good reasons, States prefer these ad hoc arrangements to the ones
they negotiated so laboriously at Geneva.
Other formal legal provisions regarding implementation have been the basis
for a wide range of subsequent practice that has gone further than was
envisaged when the provisions were originally concluded. Although the
ICRC's role is limited in certain obvious ways and it has consistently refused to

364

Adam Roberts
assist prosecutions by providing evidence, some aspects of its role as a body with
important rights of initiative, and duties to oversee some aspects of
implementation, have built upon what is in the conventions. It has, for
example, made a number of public statements about violations. 1o Even more
significantly, the modest treaty provisions for the UN to have a role in
implementation, summarized later in this paper, have been accompanied by an
increase in UN practice.
One much,publicized legal basis of the increased interest of States and
international bodies in enforcement has been the interpretation placed on the
words of common Article 1 of the 1949 Geneva Conventions. This article calls
on States "to ensure respect for the present Convention in all circumstances."
This provision has been widely seen as implying a universal obligation of States
(and therefore of regional and global international organizations as well) to see
to implementation wherever problems aroseY However, the evidence is
compelling that Article 1 was not originally intended to mean this. 12 Whatever
the original intention behind it, the interpretation of common Article 1 as
implying a duty to promote implementation generally has helped to bring the
question of implementation of the laws of war more centrally into the discourse
of States and the activities of international organizations. States are indeed at
liberty to interpret, or rather reinterpret, their obligations under Article 1 in
this way.

Criminal Trials. Trials are commonly seen as the major mode of securing
implementation of the laws of war. The main conventions since 1945 provide
for them as one key mode of enforcement. Trials, particularly before specially
constituted international war crimes tribunals, are the focus of practically all
public discussion of the war crimes issue. The international tribunals at
Nuremberg, Tokyo, and now The Hague and Arusha, are sometimes seen as
the main means of bringing offenders to book; while at the same time they are
criticized by their detractors on various grounds, not least because their very
establishment is deemed to show how selective, even biased, the international
community is in handling this issue.
The overwhelming majority oflegal cases in connection with the laws of war
have in fact been in national, not international, courts. 13 Such trials often
attract less attention than international ones, even when they are major events
involving large numbers of suspects, as with the trials of former officials of the
deposed Dergue military junta that have been held in Ethiopia since December
1994.14 Many national trials may not appear to be about war crimes cases at all
but rather about violations of national law or military discipline, but they are
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nonetheless based on the same standards as those of international law
governing armed conflict.
Formal legal cases, whether national or international, have some inherent
limitations. The use of trial procedures is dependent on the potential
defendants being, or being forcibly brought, within a jurisdiction which is
prepared to see them prosecuted: this is by no means always possible. In
addition, the use of legal procedures against a few individuals to deal with
transgressions of norms is often debatable in cases in which offenses are
committed in what is perceived as a public cause, and in which large numbers
of people are involved in the offenses in different ways and at different levels of
authority. Even in apparently quite simple episodes unrelated to war there is
often extreme reluctance to establish individual responsibility: hence, the
shocking failure in the United Kingdom to find any individual responsible for
what was authoritatively viewed as the criminal negligence that caused the
March 1987 Zeebrugge ferry disaster.

Human Rights Law, and the Right to Individual Redress. In the past, one of
the many side effects of the inter,State character of the laws of war was a
complete absence of formal procedures for individual legal redress. If violations
occurred, it was for governments to take action: the individual may have been
the object of the law but was not in any meaningful sense its subject. This
situation has begun to change. Under several national and regional legal
systems, including those ofIsrael, Japan, the United States, and Europe, there
has been a growing tendency for individuals to bring issues arising from armed
conflicts and occupations before the courts. This is mainly, but not exclusively,
because of the development of human rights law. 1s
Various international human rights instruments allow scope for individual
redress, whether through a right of individual petition or complaint, or through
the right to bring cases. Some have involved the right to life. Although the right
to life is inevitably subject to certain limitations in times of war and insurgency,
its existence can potentially provide a basis for those whose rights have been
undermined (or their surviving relatives) to argue that an armed force acted
recklessly, granted its obligations. This was the basis of the claims, in the case of
McCann and Others v. The United Kingdom, which followed the British Special
Air Service killing of three Irish suspects in Gibraltar on 6 March 1988. The
European Court of Human Rights, in its judgment delivered on 27 September
1995, found that there had been a breach of the European Convention on
Human Rights, Article 2, on the right to life; however, it dismissed the
applicants' claim for damages because the three people killed had been preparing
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an explosion. The British government, in its instant and touchy reaction to this
judgment, showed itself notably hostile to the whole idea of UK military actions
in a long and difficult conflict being subject to European court decisions. 16

Compensation. The inherent limitations of, and sensitivities surrounding, trials
and certain other court procedures may help to explain the occasional recourse
to one other means of responding to violations: compensation. Compensation
for violations of the laws of war is an ancient institution, and as noted above, it
was reflected in the provisions of the 1907 Hague Convention on land war. It
frequently merges into the broader concept of war reparations-i.e., charges
imposed on the losing side in a war, usually linked to that side's alleged
responsibility for the outbreak of the war in the first place. In such form,
reparations are of course linked more to jus ad beUum (the law governing resort to
armed force) than to jus in beUo (the law applicable in armed conflict). One
possible attraction of arrangements for compensation and reparations is that
they can be arranged in State,to,State negotiations and do not leave the
eventual outcome to the numerous hazards associated with criminal court
proceedings. In the aftermath of the 1990,1991 Gulf conflict, the United
Nations Compensation Commission (whose work is briefly outlined later in this
paper) has pursued the path of compensation on an astonishing and
unprecedented scale. Neither in the Iraqi case nor more generally are reparatiops
and compensation necessarily an alternative to war crimes trials. Both paths can
be pursued simultaneously, as they were in respect of Germany (disastrously) in
the 1919 Treaty of V ersailles at the end of the First World War.
National Commissions of Inquiry. Although many treaties and manuals on the
subject recognize that the laws of war are implemented not transnationally but
by individual countries, they seldom set out in detail the exact mechanisms by
which such implementation is to be achieved. It is in fact through government
decisions, laws, courts and courts,martial, commissions of inquiry, military
manuals, rules of engagement, and training and educational systems that the
provisions of international law have a bearing on the conduct of armed forces
and individuals.
National commissions of inquiry are nowhere mentioned in the treaties on
the laws of war, and very seldom in legal texts on this branch oflaw Y Yet they
have in fact been one of the principal means of trying to bring practice into
conformity with law. Three examples indicate possible roles of such inquiries.
• On Northern Ireland in 1972, Lord Gardiner's minority report (which
was accepted by the Government) to the Parker Committee report on the
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interrogation methods used there was an interesting example of asserting the
wider relevance, even in an internal conflict, of certain international legal
standards, including some from the main body of the four 1949 Geneva
Conventions. IS
• Following the massacres of Palestinians at Sabra and Shatilla camps in
Beirut in September 1982, it was an Israeli official report which helped
establish the facts surrounding these events and reminded Israel that certain
standards had to apply not only to the actions of the Israel
Defence Forces but also to those locally based paramilitary forces operating in
conjunction with them.19
• In Canada, a wide range of actions followed violations of basic norms
(including norms of the law of war) by Canadian forces while on
operations in Somalia in 1992-1993. In 1993-1994 there were
numerous
of Canadian soldiers involved in the Somalia
operations; there was a military Board ofInquiry into these events. An entire
force, the Canadian Airborne Regiment, was disbanded on 5
March 1995, principally because some of its members had been involved in
crimes in Somalia. Finally, there was an official Commission ofInquiry, which
issued a highly critical report in 1997.20
Commissions of inquiry have their limitations. They naturally tend to reflect
national preoccupations and perspectives. Curiously, in all these three cases the
terms of reference of the inquiry did not specifically identify violation of
international treaties as a question to be addressed. For whatever reasons, the
issue was often framed in terms of violations of ethical standards, of institutional
procedures, and of national law. Such concerns often overlap with those of the
laws governing armed conflict, and certainly they did so in these instances.
In societies emerging from periods of civil war or dictatorship, there are
many possible variations on the commission of inquiry format: for example, the
wide variety of truth and reconciliation commissions, or such other forms of
coping with the past as opening of official files, in countries as different as
former East Germany, South Africa, Argentina, and Chile. 21 Despite the
variety of their formats and their undoubted limitations, there are merits in
what might be termed the "commission of inquiry approach": it enables
national perspectives to be understood, it allows for more extensive and at the
same time nuanced attributions of responsibility than is the case with criminal
procedures, and above all it can open the way to critically important changes in
government policy and social attitudes.
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Controls Over Careers of Individuals. There have been many examples of the
use of administrative methods of various kinds, not necessarily involving
criminal trials, to punish or limit the influence of those who have been involved
in war crimes or related acts. In occupied Germany after 1945, the Allies
rapidly lost enthusiasm for criminal prosecutions, and thousands of cases were
not pursued: the "denazification programme" was a preferred if still flawed
administrative substitute. \Vithin many armed forces, an individual who has
been involved in questionable practices may suffer a blighted career or may be
denied the honors which would otherwise be due. A typical case was the
decision announced in Buenos Aires on 27 January 1998 to strip Captain
Alfredo Astiz of his rank of retired captain, his uniform and his navy pension:
he had been an officer in Argentina's "dirty war" in the 1970s who had
continued to defend the horrors of that period.

Other Acts of Individual Countries, Regional Organiz.ations and Alliances.
Even where efforts are made to get international enforcement following a
systematic pattern of violations by one or more unrepentant belligerents-to
get a foreign State or armed force to comply with the rules-the actions of
individual governments and regional bodies have often been important and
have often taken a form other than trials.
Diplomatic and Economic Pressures. From the late 1980s onwards member
States of the European Community made protests to Israel regarding its
policies in the occupied territories, and suspended or delayed ratification of
trade agreements. 22
Formation of a Military Coalition Against the Offending State. Sometimes
illegal conduct by a belligerent, including the commission of atrocities, may
contribute to the formation of an international military coalition against the
offending State, and it may influence the coalition's willingness to use force.
Such conduct has been a significant element in the building of many coalitions,
including the anti,Axis alliance in the Second World War, the international
coalition against Iraq in 1990,1991, the multinational intervention in Somalia
in December 1992, and the decision by NATO and the UN to initiate
Operation DELIBERATE FORCE in Bosnia,Herzegovina on 30 August 1995.
Even the possibility that such a process of illegal conduct may assist coalition
building is almost entirely neglected in the legal literature, except in the rather
specialized context of discussions of "humanitarian intervention." The way in
which violations can assist coalition building constitutes a little,recognized but
important link between jus in bello andjus ad bellum.
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Reprisals by an Adversary. A reprisal may be defined as a coercive retaliatory
measure, normally contrary to international law, taken in retaliation by one
party to a conflict with the specific purpose of making an adversary desist from
particular actions violating international law. It may be intended, for example,
to make the adversary abandon an unlawful practice of warfare. 23
On occasion the threat or actuality of reprisals can be an important means of
inducing restraint and securing implementation of the laws of war. There is
evidence that fear of reprisals played some part in the non,use of chemical
weapons by various belligerents in the Second World Warj 24 and by Iraq in the
1991 Gulf War. 25 Thus the threat of retaliation in kind has in many cases
helped to buttress the 1925 Geneva Protocol regime. It has only been where
that threat was absent, because the victim State lacked any capacity to
threaten retaliation in kind, that chemical weapons have been employed.
A threat of reprisals was implicit in the reservations made by States when
they originally acceded to the 1925 Geneva Protocol prohibiting use of gas and
bacteriological methods of warfare. At least thirty States parties (including
many major powers, not least all five that became permanent members of the
UN Security Council) specified that the Protocol would cease to be binding in
regard to any enemy State whose armed forces fail to respect the prohibitions
laid down in the Protocol.
This more or less explicit reliance on reprisals as one basis of the 1925
Geneva Protocol regime is under challenge. This is partly because of general
doubts about their utility. It is also because the adoption in 1972 of the
Biological Weapons Convention, prohibiting possession (not just use) of
biological weapons, undermined the credibility of threats of retaliation in kind,
as did the ongoing negotiations which led eventually to the 1993 Chemical
Weapons Convention. This helps to explain why since 1972 eleven of the
thirty,plus States that had made reservations safeguarding this right of reprisal
have withdrawn these reservations. 26 In 1991 two other States, Canada and the
United Kingdom, made more qualified and limited withdrawals of their
reservations, retracting them only insofar as they relate to recourse to
bacteriological methods of warfareP
Despite their utility, reprisals can sometimes be little more than a fig leaf
thinly disguising States' resort to unrestrained warfare. They have been heavily
criticized. In international legal. agreements there has been a strong tendency
to limit or even prohibit their use. The 1977 Additional Protocol I prohibits
certain types of reprisal. 28 At ratification of this agreement, a number of States
made declarations which, in interpreting some of its provisions, appeared to
keep open the possibility of reprisals. The clearest such cases are Italy's in 1986,
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Germany's in 1991, and the United Kingdom's in 1998. Italy's long statement
of interpretation included the following: "Italy will react to serious and
systematic violations by an enemy of the obligations imposed by Additional
Protocol I and in particular its Articles 51 and 52 with all means admissible
under international law in order to prevent any further violation." Germany's
declaration on this point was virtually identical. The UK statement regarding
Articles 51,55 asserted in considerable detail a qualified right of reprisa1. 29
Thus, the institution of the reprisal, although by no means generally accepted
in international society, is not yet dead. If it were to fall completely into disuse,
the question would inevitably be raised as to what the sanction underlying the
laws of war is to be, if it is not reprisals by belligerent States.

The Implementation Roles of the United Nations
The United Nations has developed, or been given, a wide range of roles in
implementation of the laws of war.30 These include General Assembly and
Security Council resolutions; monitoring and investigative work by the
Secretary,General and by other UN bodies; decisions of the International
Court ofJustice; authorization of certain uses of force to repress violations; the
creation of the international tribunals for former Yugoslavia and Rwanda; and
work aimed at the creation of an International Criminal Court. The travails of
the main UN bodies in passing an unending stream of resolutions critical of
Israeli conduct in the occupied territories are evidence that these are not easy
issues for the UN to grasp.

Treaty Provisions for UN Involvement in Implementation. There was
reference to the UN in several laws of war treaties concluded before 1980,
always in connection with the problem of implementation.31 Subsequent
treaties in the laws of war and related fields add to the UN's involvement in this
difficult area.
The 1993 Chemical Weapons Convention is first and foremost a prohibition of
manufacture and possession of such weapons, not just of use, and thus belongs
more in the category of arms control than laws of war.32 This treaty has been
seen as overcoming a perceived weakness of the 1925 Geneva Protocol,
namely, that it prohibited use but not possession. However, there is a risk that
the Chemical Weapons Convention could actually weaken the prohibition on
the use of chemical weapons. This is because it leaves some uncertainty about
the sanction that would be employed in the event of violations. Instead of
relying on the threat of retaliation, Article XII of the 1993 treaty provides for
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the application of collective measures by States Parties, including, in cases of
particular gravity, bringing the issue to the attention of the UN General
Assembly and Security Council. Whether this will prove effective in practice
remains to be seen.
The 1994 Convention on the Safety of UN and Associated Personnel (again,
only to a limited extent a laws of war agreement) covers not only peacekeeping
troops but also humanitarian workers with, for example, a nongovernmental
organization (NGO) or a specialized agency, provided they are part of an
operation under UN authority and control. It involves the UN as well as its
member States in all aspects of the implementation of the convention,
"particularly in any case where the host State is unable itself to take the
required measures. "33
The 1996 Amended Protocol II (on land mines), annexed to the 1981
Convention on Specific Conventional Weapons, makes brief reference to the
United Nations in its Article 14, which deals with compliance. Also in Article
12 it obliges parties to provide protection for, inter alia, UN
missions.34
The 1997 Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and
Transfer of
and on Their Destruction, which is a laws of war
treaty to the extent that it institutes a complete prohibition on use of this class
of weapon, again involves the UN extensively in compliance issues, mainly in
the detailed provisions of Articles
and
These treaty provisions place a heavy burden on the UN, especially the
Security Council. Whether UN bodies will be able to respond effectively
weaknesses in getting
remains to be seen, especially in view of their
prompt agreement on controversial issues, and then getting any agreement
that is reached effectively implemented. In any case, the importance of these
treaty provisions should not be exaggerated. Much of the actual increase of UN
action in relation to the laws of war has not arisen because of them, but because
of a general tendency of States to look to UN bodies for interpretation,
monitoring and enforcement.

The International Court of Justice. The International CourtofJustice (ICJ) at
The Hague has long had certain limited roles in respect of implementation of
the laws of war. There are specific references to the IC] in the 1948 Genocide
Convention36 and the 1954 Hague Cultural Property Convention.37 However,
the Court's Statute, with its
limitations on what type of cases may be
brought to it and by whom, is likely to allow it to look only at a minority of
issues concerning the laws of war.
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Many cases brought before it have involved key laws of war matters: for
example, the Corfu Channel Case in 1949;38 Nicaragua v. USA in 1986;39 and
the 1996 Advisory Opinion on the Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear
Weapons. 40 The first two cases involved the principle that a State laying mines
at sea is obliged to give notification of their location in order to protect the
security of peaceful shipping. The third case led to an opinion which, though
cautious, did clarify, or publicize, the dubious legality of almost any actual use
of nuclear weapons.
Many cases have involved issues analogous, and potentially relevant, to laws
of war problems. The United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran case
concerned the treatment of individuals under the protection of international
law in an emergency situationY The Frontier Dispute (Burkina Faso/Mali) case
raised the question of interim measures of protectionY The 1971 Advisory
Opinion on Namibia involved several germane matters, including the use of a
sanction: termination of a League/UN mandate as a response to failures to
observe certain rules of restraintY
In Bosnia and Herzegovina's action against the Federal Republic of
Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro), Case Concerning the Application of the
Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, the IC]
has been asked to declare Yugoslavia in violation of a wide range of legal
provisions. In September 1993 the Court ordered interim measures, requiring
Yugoslavia to do all in its power to prevent genocide. Any effect of this order
was limited. This case is currently proceeding slowly.
In many of these cases on which it has reached decisions, the ICJ has
performed a useful service by clarifying the content of the laws of war and their
application to particular and often complex circumstances, and by publicizing
fundamental principles which should inform the policy making of States in
matters relating to the use of force. However, there are limits to what the IC]
can be expected to achieve. Many States are reluctant to let cases concerning
their own survival be settled by a distant conclave in The Hague. There are
doubts about the capacity of the court to reach satisfactory conclusions on
contentious factual matters. In an emergency situation, aggrieved States may
also worry about the slowness of some (but certainly not all) of its proceedings.
When it is asked to comment in a general way on complex issues which are
bones of contention among statesmen and lawyers-as in the nuclear weapons
case-the Court's decision may not be found universally persuasive. Above all,
the ICJ is not a criminal court, and its unavoidable lack of capacity to try
individuals for violations is one of the considerations that has fed the growing
demand for the establishment of an International Criminal Court.
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UN Attempts to Secure Implementation in Some Conflicts of the 1990s
Since the early 1980s the UN Security Council has had a particularly
important role in implementation matters. It has issued countless pleas to
belligerents to observe the laws of war, investigated violations (Iran,Iraq War),
authorized a military intervention one of whose purposes was to restore respect
for humanitarian law (Somalia), authorized a major use of force in response to
attacks on "safe areas" (Bosnia,Herzegovina), and set up international
tribunals (former Yugoslavia and Rwanda).
This deep involvement of the UN in implementation raises an issue of wider
significance: that international law is commonly said to be weak law because it
lacks any central enforcement mechanism. The UN Security Council has been
increasingly seen as potentially constituting just such a mechanism-and at
least as much for implementation of the laws of war as of any other area oflaw.
Yet the UN's involvement in implementation has been extremely selective.
The UN Security Council has not sought to secure implementation of the law
in all conflicts whose termination it has assisted. For example, the long war in
Mozambique after independence in 1975 involved many atrocities, yet the
peace settlement of 1992 was not made contingent on legal trials of those
involved. Likewise the settlement in Cambodia under the 1991 Paris
agreements did not involve any systematic accounting for past crimes,
although these had been on a vast scale. The peace accords in Guatemala in
1994,1996, although they did include a "commitment against impunity"
(which had distinctly limited impact), did not establish any specific mechanism
for punishing the crimes committed in the decades,long civil war.44
In three conflicts in the 1990s-those involving Kuwait, former Yugoslavia,
and Rwanda-the United Nations became heavily involved in attempts to
secure implementation of the laws of war, and some striking innovations
resulted. A brief examination of these cases may suggest some strengths and
weaknesses of the UN's approaches to the problems of implementation.

The Conflict Over Kuwait, 1990,1991. After Iraq occupied Kuwait in 1990,
Security Council Resolution 674 of29 October 1990 invited States to collect
information on Iraqi violations of international humanitarian law. However,
with the suspension of military activities on 28 February 1991 the coalition
governments suddenly became quiet on the subject of the responsibility of
Saddam Hussein and colleagues for major war crimes. This was despite the fact
that Iraq had added to its crimes the torture of coalition prisoners of war and
the wanton despoilation of Kuwait. The Security Council passed many
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resolutions on the
reparations, and the dismantling of Iraq's
capability for chemical warfare; one of these, Resolution 687 of3 April 1991, is
its longest ever. Yet nothing was said on the subject of personal responsibility
for war crimes. Similarly, in less than three months after the cessation of
hostilities some
thousand Iraqi prisoners of war were repatriated
without any attempt to sift out those suspected of war crimes-a process which
might have delayed repatriation by years.
There were genuine difficulties in pursuing the war crimes issue. First and
foremost, Saddam Hussein would have been difficult to arrest even had the
coalition military action had more
goals. After the end of
hostilities, it would have been awkward to call for his arrest as a war criminal
while at the same time negotiating
terms with his government.
Further, outside powers were reluctant to press for trials iflocal powers would
not join them in doing this. There were hazards in limiting trials to the conflict
of
as the Iraqi regime had engaged in criminal activities externally
and internally both before and after that episode.
However, the failure to take any action against the Iraqi leaders exposed a
serious problem regarding the laws of war, namely, the difficulty of securing
enforcement even after clear evidence of violations. The Pentagon ended its
Final Report pointedly: "A strategy should be developed to respond to Iraqi
violations of the law of war, to make clear that a price will be paid for such
violations, and to deter future violators.,,45 The United States did prepare a
war crimes report in 1992, which was issued without fanfare by the
UN in March 1993.46 The net outcome is that Iraqi leaders might face trial if
they show their faces in Western States-but not necessarily in, say, Amman,
as in the case of Hussein Kamel in
The UN has gone down another path, which was also signposted in the laws
of war: compensation. The United Nations Compensation Commission, set up
under the terms of Security Council resolution 692 of20 May 1991, is based on
the principle that Iraq is internationally responsible for its unlawful acts, mainly
under the jus ad bellum, but not excluding considerations ofjus in bello. 48 By the
January 1997 deadline, 2.6 million claims had been filed for a total of
approximately U.S. $250 billion. Initially, the only funds available to the
Compensation Commission came from the partial liquidation of Iraq's assets
abroad.49 Then, under the "food for oil" program agreed with Iraq in a
memorandum signed on 20 May 1996 and implemented in 1997,30 percent of
the proceeds from Iraqi oil sales went to the compensation fund. By the end of
1997 the UN Compensation Commission had paid out $726 million in partial
or complete payment of several hundred thousand claims.5o
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The approach of seeking financial redress on the basis of State responsibility
has some obvious advantages: matters can be settled in negotiations between
States, sometimes fairly quickly. However, as the case ofIraq suggests, to hold a
country as a whole liable for the costs of a war is intensely problematic. It is
likely to involve a whole population in paying for offenses committed by a
minority among them. The process of payment may drag out for decades and
cause dangerous political resentments against those imposing the penalties. If
submitting a few individuals to trial and punishment seems dangerously
selective when a larger number may be responsible, punishing the whole
population over a long period is open to the accusation of being indiscriminate.

The Fonner Yugoslavia Since 1991. The international community could
scarcely have faced a more difficult challenge than seeing to the
implementation and enforcement of the laws of war in the conflicts that raged
in Croatia and Bosnia,Herzegovina in 1991,1995. These wars being about
attempts at creating States out of ethnically complex republics, a principal
purpose of certain belligerents was to achieve an object which itself necessarily
involves violations of the laws of war: expulsions of populations and their
replacement by other populations. Major States and international
organizations had only limited involvement, and therefore only limited means
of exerting pressure on the belligerents.
From early on, outside bodies, including particularly the UN Security
Council, asserted the applicability of rules governing international armed
conflict and pressed belligerents to comply with their obligations under
humanitarian law.51 This pattern of activity constituted a moral escalator on
which entreaties had to be followed by action of some kind. Thus the London
Conference on the former Yugoslavia of 26,27 August 1992-a joint EC and
UN initiative-decided to "take all possible legal action to bring to account
those responsible for committing or ordering grave breaches of international
humanitarian law." Security Council Resolution 780 of 6 October 1992 asked
the Secretary,General to establish an impartial Commission of Experts to
examine evidence of grave breaches of international humanitarian law. Then
in decisions of February and May 1993 the Council set up the International
Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia.
The process was influenced by the political and moral pressure, strong in
many countries, to do something about Yugoslavia, and by lack of agreement as
to what else could be done. At that time in 1993 the international community
was conspicuously unable to agree on any major intervention or other decisive
action, and the Tribunal was one of the few options left. The pressure to
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establish it was reinforced by the fact that the local States and
entities could not be trusted to put their criminals on trial; indeed in some cases
they were headed by criminals.
The Tribunal, under the guidance of Judge Antonio Cassese as President,
made significant progress in establishing itself and embarking on its difficult
task. Particular care was given to drawing up Rules of Procedure and Evidence,
dealing as they do with sensitive matters on which national systems offer very
different models. The first contested trial, that ofDusko Tadic, a Bosnian Serb,
started in The Hague in May 1996. On 7 May 1997 he was found guilty of
crimes against humanity (on six counts) and of violations of the laws of war (on
five counts). On 14 July 1997 he was sentenced to imprisonment for twenty
years. An appeal is pending. Tadic was not a remotely senior figure in the
Bosnian Serb hierarchy; the case confirmed that there is bound to be an
element of happenstance as to who can actually be brought to The Hague for
trial.
It was obvious from the start that achievement of the goals for which the
Tribunal was established might be blocked by several factors, including: (1) the
probable need, in efforts to end the war, to deal politically with the very people
who might be wanted for war crimes; (2) the difficulty of getting suspects
arrested and brought to The Hague; and (3) the difficulty of getting witnesses
to give evidence and of ensuring their safety both before and after. Thus, the
Tribunal could only hope to operate effectively if there were political changes
in the region favorable to its operation or if sufficient pressure were exerted on
the States and other political entities in the region to induce them to
cooperate.
In 1993 the Security Council had sought to justify the setting up of the
T ribunallargely in terms of its short and
effects, in relation to the
and the restoration of peace:
ongoing
[Tlhe establishment of an international tribunal would bring about the
achievement of the aim of putting an end to such crimes and of taking effective
measures to bring to justice the persons responsible for them, and would
contribute to the restoration and maintenance of peace.52

These arguments are serious. In particular, the argument that peace requires
that justice be done contains persuasive elements. If all Serbs, or Croats, are
deemed equally guilty in an undifferentiated way, that is a recipe for unending
conflict. Attaching guilt to individuals can help lay the foundations for
reconciliation and political reconstruction. However, there is reason to doubt
whether the existence of the International Criminal Tribunal achieved the first
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aim outlined by the Security Council, namely, the ending of such crimes during
the war; also, the contribution of the Tribunal to the second aim, the
restoration of peace, has proved problematical.
A major question raised sharply by events in Yugoslavia is: should UN
peacekeeping forces gather information about war crimes and arrest suspects?
A similar question arose for the personnel of the Office of the High
Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and other agencies, for UN Human
Rights Action Teams, and for European Union monitors.53 In the case of
UNPROFOR (the UN peacekeeping force that witnessed many atrocities in
Croatia and in Bosnia), insofar as a clear answer emerged, it appears to have
been that information on violations may be recorded and passed on, including
by some national contingents through their own national authorities.
However, it was not a formal part of the UNPROFOR mandate to arrest
suspected war criminals and hand them over for possible trial. Sometimes UN
peacekeepers were passive onlookers at atrocities. This was particularly so at
Srebrenica at the time of its capture by Bosnian Serb forces in July 1995. There
was ample evidence that UNPROFOR in general, and the Dutch forces who
had the misfortune to be in place at the time, knew of atrocities committed
against Muslim men and did little. There have also been press suggestions that
the governments of Britain, the United States, and the Netherlands sought to
play down the massacre.54
One means of dealing with violations of the laws of war in the former
Yugoslavia was the threat and use of force by NATO in conjunction with the
UN. Several NATO military operations were specifically justified as responses
to attacks on civilians, including the two major attacks on the market place in
Sarajevo: the first such attack, on 5 February 1994, led to the creation of the
Sarajevo exclusion zone; the second, on 28 August 1995, led to NATO's
bombing campaign, Operation DELIBERATE FORCE. This NATO campaign
was also influenced crucially by the Srebrenica massacre of July 1995, which
strongly increased the pressure on Western governments to take effective
action. The bombing appears to have played a part in inducing the Bosnian
Serbs to accept peace terms they had earlier rejected. Operation
DELIBERATE FORCE, NATO's first major application of force, has not been
much discussed as a case of responding to violations of the laws of war, but in
large measure it was exactly that.
The Dayton Accords, concluded on 20,21 November 1995, appear to
ensure in numerous provisions that peace is not bought at the price of
forgetting war crimes. The General Framework Agreement mentions "the
obligation of all Parties to cooperate in the investigation and prosecution of war
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crimes and other violations of international humanitarian law.,,55 The military
agreement requires the parties to "cooperate fully" with the International
Tribunal.56 The constitution of Bosnia and Herzegovina specifies that "no
person who is under indictment by the Tribunal and who has failed to comply
with an order to appear before the Tribunal, may stand as a candidate or hold
any appointive, elective or other public office in the territory of Bosnia and
Herzegovina.,,57 The UN International Police Task Force (IPTF) established
under Dayton has a responsibility to provide information to the International
Tribunal.58
After the Dayton Accords were signed in Paris, implementation of the laws
of war continued to be problematical in former Yugoslavia. There was a
campaign, not very effective except in the Serb world and in some countries
particularly sympathetic to Serbia, to cast doubt on the legitimacy and
impartiality of the Tribunal. Serbs in particular seized'on various happenings as
supposed evidence of the bad faith of the Tribunal. Antonio Cassese, President
of the Tribunal, at least twice informed the UN Security Council of the refusal
of the Republika Srpska and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and
Montenegro) to cooperate with the Tribunal.59 The Federal Republic of
Yugoslavia did permit the Tribunal to establish an office in Belgrade, and by
1997 was offering it some very limited cooperation. In 1997 Croeltia handed
over a few suspects for trial.
Since Dayton, the main problems of implementation of legal norms have
concerned attempts to secure return of refugees (attempts which have had very
little success) .and efforts to get those indicted of war crimes arrested. In 1995
and 1996 there was a succession of contradictory statements from spokesmen
for the NATO,led Implementation Force (IFOR) as to whether it was or was
not part of the force's duty to search for and arrest suspected war criminals, a
question touched upon, but not answered unambiguously, in the UN Security
Council resolution on IFOR of December 1995.60 International arrest warrants
for Radovan Karadzic and Ratko Mladic were issued by the Tribunal on 11 July
1996, pointedly addressed to "all States and to the Implementation Force
(IFOR)." In summer 1997 two other suspects were arrested by international
forces in former Yugoslavia: one by UNTAES (United Nations Transitional
Administration for Eastern Slavonia) on 27 June, and one by British troops in
the Stabilization Force (SFOR), which was the continuation of IFOR, on 10
July. At the time of the latter arrest, another suspect was shot dead. Three
more indictees were arrested by SFOR in December 1997 and January 1998.
The Tribunal may in the long run have some part in the restoration of
battered norms. In this respect its impact may be general as much as in former

379

Implementation of the Laws of War
Yugoslavia. It could have an important educational and moral role, and the
fact that its proceedings are being televised could reinforce that. The Tribunal
merits support, but at the same time there is a need for understanding of the
inherent difficulties of the tasks with which it is entrusted.

The International Tribunal for Rwanda. The acts of genocide in Rwanda in
the first half of 1994 required a response from the UN Security Council. It
failed to secure the cooperation of States to take effective action to stop the
killings, but in November 1994 it took steps to establish the International
Tribunal for Rwanda. 61 It too was established against a background of a failure
of the international community to do anything more decisive. Nonetheless,
this was the first time that an international criminal tribunal had been
established in respect of an essentially
situation. The
adoption by the UN Security Council of the Statute for this tribunal (which, in
contrast to the tribunal on Yugoslavia, is predicated on the assumption that the
conflict in Rwanda is
provides some legal reinforcement to
the claim that failure to observe certain basic humanitarian rules is an
international offense even in civil wars. The government of Rwanda, despite
reservations and difficulties, is offering some collaboration with the Tribunal,
which is located in Arusha in Tanzania. The first trials began in 1997, but the
tribunal has been beset by difficulties. As with the Yugoslav Tribunal, only a
few indictees have been brought into custody. The organization of the Tribunal
was severely criticized in a UN report in February 1997: a second report one
year later, while noting significant improvements, also pointed to remaining
weaknesses. The continuing bitter conflicts in the Great Lakes region,
T utsi killings within Rwanda, do not suggest that the Tribunal
including
has yet had a significant effect in reducing the horrors.

Twelve General Issues and Conclusions
In 1993 Sir Frank Berman, Legal Adviser to the UK Foreign and
Commonwealth Office, wrote in a useful study of the problems of compliance:
"It seems to many that the problem is not to discover what the law is, or how to
apply it to the particular case, or even whether the existing rule is 'satisfactory'
or not, but rather how to secure or compel compliance with the law at all."62 If
this diagnosis is accepted, it becomes necessary to put forward some thoughts
about why the implementation problem is so difficult, how implementation
works on the occasions when it does, and what the results have been, or may be
in the future, of new efforts-through the UN and international criminal
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tribunals-to overcome previous problems of implementation. The twelve
points below attempt to draw some lessons from the hesitant and incomplete
transition from a largely State,based system of implementation to one which
also encompasses a wide range of UN,based elements. Their underlying theme
is that implementation of the laws of war is not only a narrow humanitarian!
legal matter, but is also a key aspect of the conduct of international relations
and the management of national and international security policies.
First, there are historical errors and political dangers in a picture of
"international humanitarian law" as coming out of Geneva, as' a gospel that needs
merely to be disseminated and applied in the rest of the world, or as a body of
law that can progressively bring the use of force under control. Such perceptions of
the law may have contributed to some of its disastrous failures in the 1980s and
1990s. The term "laws of war" is preferable to "international humanitarian law."
There is a need to place more emphasis on the idea that this body oflaw is intensely
practical-that it represents, at least in part, a set of professional military standards
and bargains among States; that its origins are as much military as diplomatic; and
that its implementation can have consequences which are for the most part
compatible with the interests of those applying it.
Second, some of the formal provisions in treaties on the laws of war for
securing compliance with their terms have not worked well. Cases in point are
the provisions for Protecting Powers (which have been little used) and the
establishment of the International Fact,Finding Commission (used not at all).
As was envisaged in some treaties, trials, whether before national or
international tribunals, are an important means of implementing the laws of
war. However, they are by no means the only such means, and attention
should not be centered exclusively on this form of enforcement. The
near, exclusive preoccupation oflawyers with major international trials reduces
the numerous strands in the rope of implementation to one single strand,
which is liable to break under the strain. The two international tribunals
established in respect of former Yugoslavia and Rwanda may yet have a
deterrent impact, but they have experienced difficulties, and remain crucially
dependent on the cooperation of States. They have not replaced national trials
of various kinds, which have continued in parallel with the two international
tribunals.
Third, some other formal provisions regarding implementation have worked
better, especially those providing for assistance by the ICRe. However, the
ICRC's role is necessarily a limited one owing to requirements of
confidentiality, impartiality, and neutrality, and it can do little or nothing to
assist political, judicial, and military responses to violations.
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Fourth, some formal and informal procedures, and methods of inducing
compliance and responding to violations, have developed that were only
foreseen to a limited extent in earlier treaties. Many such developments have
been assisted by extensive media coverage of crises and conflicts involving laws
of war issues.
In particular, and fifth, actions by international organizations, coalitions,
and alliances have become an increasingly significant factor in the
implementation process. Since the 1980s the United Nations (especially the
Security Council) has acquired a key role in a wide range of attempts to secure
observance and enforcement of the laws of war. This role, still in its infancy,
has run into many difficulties, but it offers certain advantages over a
system of implementation.
Sixth, several
military interventions have had as part of their
formal justification the persistence of violations of humanitarian law in the
country concerned. There are strong and legitimate worries, particularly in
some postcolonial States, that the increased diplomatic attention to the
implementation of international humanitarian standards could have the
unintended effect of providing a basis for external intervention, and even a
new form of colonialism.
In some countries and regions, seventh, there is a growing tendency for
individuals to bring cases, often based on human rights law but in which the
law of armed conflict may also be relevant, before either national or
international courts and institutions.
Relatedly, and eighth, the idea of an International Criminal Court, as a main
means of securing implementation of the laws of war as well as of certain other
international rules, is making progress at the UN. However, its establishment
and operation depend on State compliance. For better or for worse, and
whatever their formal positions on the proposal, some States can be expected
in one way or another to seek to delay action on the proposed court and to
circumscribe its powers of investigation, arrest, and prosecution, in order to
prevent their own military or political leaders from being exposed to the risk of
trial. Further, there is a risk, to which the ICRC has drawn attention, that
States might use the existence of such a court as an excuse for not carrying out
their existing obligations to ensure that all who commit grave breaches are put
on trial, regardless of nationality.63
Indeed, ninth, and again for better or for worse, we live in a world of States.
In most cases the laws of war, like other parts of international law, are
implemented through national mechanisms of various kinds: deliberations in
government departments, national laws, manuals of military law, rules of
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engagement,

commissions of inquiry, national courts,
and administrative controls over military institutions and over
system of implementation also encompasses the
careers. The
practice of engaging in reprisals against States perceived to be violating the law.
In one way or another, the continuing if diminished relevance of reprisals has
been emphasized by a number of States in their reservations to laws of war
treaties.
Tenth, the
system of implementation suffers from certain
flaws: States are reluctant to take firm action against their own
against foreign States
nationals, and their tendency to rely on military
perceived as violating fundamental norms can degenerate into uncontrolled
war. Thus, the search for improved systems of implementation (whether to
supplement or replace those of States) is bound to continue in the
century.
Despite (eleventh) the many ongoing attempts to strengthen the means of
formal international legal redress against major war crimes committed by a
State, there remains a strong case for viewing the laws of war as having thus far
consisted principally of a set of internationally approved national professional
military standards, backed up by national military and civil legal systems, rather
than as a system of international criminal justice. As in the
1991 Gulf
conflict, there can be powerful reasons for a State or coalition to apply the laws
of war even in the absence of reciprocity by the adversary.
Twelfth, and finally, a critical intellectual weakness which has seriously
affected understanding and implementation of the laws of war is the almost
complete divorce between two important schools of thought about security
matters in the
1945 period. On the one hand, theorists of deterrence (a
concept not limited to its most extreme form, nuclear deterrence) have shown
little interest in the laws of war. On the other hand, proponents of
international humanitarian law have had little to say about deterrence of any
kind, nuclear or conventional. In an age in which major powers have become
more deeply involved than ever in implementation of the laws of war but do not
seem to be doing particularly well at it, we can no longer afford the luxury of
this
weakness. The separation between deterrence and the laws of
war will not disappear entirely, but it could be reduced if there were more open
acceptance that even rules of restraint need to be backed up with threats of
severe consequences; that the tribunals established in respect of former
Yugoslavia and Rwanda are envisaged as having a deterrent purpose; that
deterring violations of humanitarian norms is already a function of much
international political and military action; that effective international use of
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force in an alliance or UN context requires common understandings of the
legal rules on how force is employed; and that public support for a military
action may depend on confidence that it not only has sound strategic and
political aims, but also is in conformity with the international law governing
the conduct of armed conflict.
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